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Almost all human activities, both in the professional world and in 
private life, are based on interaction between people. At the same time 
everyone is familiar with the problems that occur in human 
communication. One may even argue that one of the most serious 
problems of our world is that people do not understand each other. During 
the last few decades, a great number of studies have been carried out in 
order to analyse and classify communication failures. Zaefferer (1977) was 
one of the first researchers who tried to classify them by using a matrix 
with 3 x 8 theoretically possible types of misunderstandings. As Falkner 
(1997, 32–33) has shown, the systematization made by Zaefferer is 
interesting as such, but many important factors remain unnoticed. 
Bazzanella and Damiano’s work (1999) is important due to statistical data 
on the frequency of different types of failures, though they deal only with 
failures based on linguistic features. This is an important point of view, but 
it ignores many other aspects of miscommunication. Unconventional, 
rather formal models are provided by Anolli (2001) and Adrissono et al. 
(1998). ? new attempt to approach problems in communication is 
presented by Janicki (2010), who uses the methodology of folk linguistics 
(Niedzielki & Preston 2003). Overviews of Western theories and 
classifications of miscommunication can be found, among others, in 
(Dascal 1999; Tzanne 2000; Olsina 2002; House et al. 2003; Verdonik 
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2010).  
There are interesting studies dealing with the classification of 
miscommunication in languages other than English. The classification 
presented in (Ermakova & Zemskaja 1993) is notable for the amount of 
factual material and detailed analysis. Working on the Ukrainian material, 
Bacevi? (2006) provides a detailed taxonomy of causes of 
miscommunication, differentiating three basic types: those caused (1) by 
the interlocutors, (2) by the speech situation, and (3) by the code 
(language). One of the most sophisticated analyses of types of 
miscommunication is Falkner’s study (1997), where he differentiates a 
variety of causes: (1) articulative, auditive, or acoustic (“lautlich”); (2) 
cultural differences; (3) differences in knowledge; (4) intentional 
communication failures; (5) special expectations on the basis of “scripts”; 
(6) context.  
Another approach to miscommunication is demonstrated by Linell 
(1995; see also Hinnenkamp 2001, 2003). While the researchers 
mentioned above classify its causes, Linell wants to clarify how 
communication failures occur in a flow of dialogue, how “visible” they 
are. He therefore divides them into three main categories: “overt,” 
“latent,” and “covert.” We are thus dealing with the reactions of the 
interlocutors to the situation they are involved in. In overt 
misunderstanding, there is an immediate recognition of the 
misunderstanding. A covert misunderstanding takes place when the 
interlocutors gradually recognize that they have misinterpreted each other 
at an earlier stage in the conversation. A latent misunderstanding remains 
unrecognized, but an outside observer notices it, or the interlocutors 
themselves have a feeling that everything in the conversation was not as it 
should be. 
Despite an increasing number of studies on miscommunication, little 
attention has been paid to the genre-specific nature of the phenomenon. 
The aim of this paper is to raise hypotheses concerning the differentiation 
of the risks of communication in various genres. In approaching this 
question, we will first consider the terminological and theoretical 
apparatus that will be used. 
Miscommunication is used in this paper as an umbrella notion for different 
types of communication failures, such as: “misunderstanding,” “non-
understanding,” “communication breakdown,” “discomfort in 
communication,” “misconception,” “(wrong) reference identification,” 
“mishearing,” “non-hearing,” “non-listening,” “misperception,” 
“communication disorder.” Confusingly, researchers tend to use the same 
terms with different meanings (for reasoning about these and other terms, 
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see, Grimshaw 1980; Coupland et al. 1991; Foppa 1995; Weigand 1999; 
Tzanne 2000). Miscommunication is defined here in the same way as 
Ryan & Barnard (2009, 45): it refers to situations in which the recipient 
understands the message in a different way than it was intended by the 
speaker. 
Risk and Causes of Miscommunication 
We will use Fig. 2.1 below to explain the variety of risks and causes of 
miscommunication. The idea behind the picture is to describe different 
significant features of communication at the same time. In doing so, we 
expand the angle on human interaction by paying attention to factors 
which are usually ignored in linguistic research. Thus, it reflects real 
human interaction in a more detailed way than Shannon’s (and Weaver’s) 
famous information theory model or some newer variants (Dobrick 1985, 
97, Falkner 1997, 88). Such a multidisciplinary approach enables us to 
obtain a more complete picture of this complex phenomenon. Kecskes 
(2010) speaks in this connection of a “socio-cognitive approach.” Weigand 
mentions that linguistics moves from searching for “the simple” towards 
challenging “the complex” (Weigand 2004, 3), or from “reductionism” to 
“holism” (Weigand 2011). This is in line with the approach that is applied 
in this study. 
 
Figure 2.1. A multidimensional model of interaction (Mustajoki 2008, 2011b, 
2012). 
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To clarify the various elements of this model, we will assume that the 
Speaker wants to utter one of the following phrases.  
 
(1) John studies Chinese language and literature. 
(2) John studies Chinese language and biology. 
(3) John studies Chinese language and philosophy. 
 
The starting point of a message is a certain meaning which the speaker 
wishes to express. In most cases the meaning is linked with a referential 
world, a fragment of which the speaker is referring to. In phrase (1) there 
is a certain John who is conducting an activity called “studying,” with the 
aim of learning more about a language and literature, in this case Chinese. 
In choosing the form to express this meaning, the speaker has several 
options. Instead of saying just “John,” he or she may add some further 
details to help the recipient to recognize the person concerned, e.g. by 
saying “my friend John.” In selecting the predicate, one option is to say “is 
studying,” etc. When the speaker moves on from the form to overt 
interaction, i.e pronounces the phrase, possible risks of misunderstandings 
can be caused by slips of the tongue, e.g. mixing up “John” and “Jim.” 
Further types of miscommunication appear at the stage of overt 
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interaction. The recipient may not hear the message properly (non-
hearing), hears “Jim” instead of “John” (mishearing), or thinks of 
something else and fails to listen to the “speaker” (non-listening). 
In the process of producing speech, the “mental world” (henceforth 
MW) of the speaker plays a crucial role. This starts with the way we in 
which we interpret the referential world: everything we see in it and want 
to  say  about  it  is  somehow  connected  to  our  MW.  Under  a  broad  
definition, adopted in Mustajoki (2008, 2012), the concept of MW 
includes people’s individual linguistic ability. In fact, everything we say is 
in one way or another based on speech in the language that we have heard 
before the moment of communication, including those elements that we 
create during the process of interaction (Gasparov 2006). The MW of the 
recipient plays an equally important role. Even during the initial phase, i.e. 
hearing and listening to the message, the recipient refers to her or his MW. 
Mishearings, such as “Jim” instead of “John,” are most likely to occur 
because a particular Jim stands at the forefront of the recipient’s MW, 
unlike anyone called John. 
Before  continuing  the  presentation  of  the  inner  part  of  Fig.  2.1,  a  
clarification is needed. Although the figure gives a systematic description 
of the process of producing an utterance, there are moments of uncertainty 
at all its phases. For example, it is a well-known fact that, from the 
ontological point of view, various “worlds” can be differentiated. 
According to Mustajoki (2006a, 2007), there are three main types of 
“worlds”: the real world, virtual worlds (fiction, fairy tales, dreams etc.), 
and a person’s inner world (feelings, sensations, etc.). As to the “meaning” 
(what we are aiming to say), it  is in many cases a rather sketchy plan for 
expressing something. As a matter of fact, there are more “meanings” than 
words in languages. Therefore, it is far from being the rule that a suitable 
“form” can be found for our “meaning.” “Every utterance is only an 
approximation to the very thought the speaker has in mind” (Junker et al. 
2003, 1742). In addition to this, although the inner circle of Fig. 2.1 gives 
an impression that the process of producing and receiving speech consists 
of a set of consecutive phases, in real interaction these phases overlap and 
backward steps may also occur during the process.  
When describing the role of the Recipient, the significance of the MW 
becomes even more evident. An important part of MWs is the cultural and 
intellectual background of the communicants. This issue has been a 
popular topic in the research literature on intercultural communication. 
The terminology and concepts vary. In the Western tradition, widely used 
terms include presupposition, stereotype, script, mental set, mental map, 
thought structure, scene, and schema. In studies on miscommunication, as 
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a basis of mutual understanding researchers refer to “common (or mutual) 
knowledge” (Stalnaker 1978, Clark & Brennan 1991, Clark 1996) and 
“shared beliefs” (Airenti et al. 1993). The terms mentioned above see the 
issue  from  different  points  of  view,  but  as  a  whole  all  of  them  are  
connected  to  some  parts  of  the  MW.  In  Russian  linguistics  and  
ethnography, considerable attention has been paid to culturally dependent 
“concepts” and the notions of “kartina mira” (world picture) and 
“iazykovaia kartina mira” (linguistic world picture) (Stepanov 2001; 
Šmeljov  2002,  among others;  see  also  “images  of  the  world”  in  Campos  
2007). Studies on “cognitive basis” and “individual” and “collective 
space” (“prostranstvo”) by a number of scholars (Krasnykh 2002; Gudkov 
2003, and others) adapt and develop the ideas of the Russian psychological 
school (Vygotsky, Luriya, Leontjev) in the framework of intercultural 
communication. In most cases, the notion of cultural and intellectual 
background is used to describe the differences between interlocutors in 
intercultural (interethnic) conversation. Less attention has been paid to 
differences between people within the same language community. Our 
everyday experience confirms that the role of differences in cultural 
background is extremely important even in interaction between native 
speakers.  
To show the significance of MWs, we return to our examples. The first 
phrase  is  interpreted  by  most  people  in  the  sense  that  John  studies  the  
Chinese language and Chinese literature. The second example, by contrast, 
is taken to mean that John studies general biology, rather than something 
called “Chinese biology.” These interpretations are based on our MWs, 
where the notion of Chinese literature does exist, but that of “Chinese 
biology” does not. These phrases, despite their exactly parallel syntactic 
structures which theoretically admit two readings, generate no 
comprehension problems because people’s MWs give them similar 
interpretations. 
In contrast to phrases (1) and (2), problems may appear when the 
Speaker utters phrase (3), because here the interpretations may vary: in 
some people’s MWs, “Chinese philosophy” will sound like a plausible 
academic subject to be studied in conjunction with the language, while 
others will prefer the alternative interpretation, “Chinese language and 
general philosophy.” Such a discrepancy between MWs is not in itself a 
cause of miscommunication, but it does constitute a risk factor. This leads 
us to the next section, where the role of recipient design is described. 
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Recipient Design and Egocentrism of the Speaker 
When we speak, we conduct monitoring and recipient design. This 
viewpoint derives from Grice’s (1975) idea of the “cooperative principle,” 
according to which the speaker tries to make him/herself as understandable 
as possible by taking into account who (s)he is talking to. The term 
“recipient design” (or “audience design”; Sacks & Schegloff 1979; Bell 
1984) reflects the speaker’s way of conducting interaction. Within the 
“communication accommodation theory” (Giles 1973), the term 
“convergence” has been proposed; it refers to the speaker’s strategy of 
adapting her/his communicative behaviour to the recipient. Supporters of 
the concept claim that there is a general propensity for communicators to 
converge along salient dimensions of speech (Ylänne-McEwen & 
Coupland 2000). 
A wider concept in describing the behaviour of the speaker is 
“monitoring.” In order to ensure correct reception of the message, the 
Speaker is constantly tracking the reactions of the recipient (Ferreira & 
Rogers 2005). Monitoring is a complex process consisting of various, 
usually unconscious, acts (Clark & Krych 2004) and can lead to minor or 
major readjustments in speech. If we notice that the recipient has not 
understood what we have said, we can repeat our utterance more loudly or 
slowly, or rephrase it. 
Before having a closer look at the notion of recipient design 
(henceforth  RD),  it  is  worth  launching  another  term,  which  is  “genre  
design.” It refers to our ability to accommodate our speech to various 
communicative situations. We automatically adopt different manners of 
speaking in a pub, at home, and in giving a public lecture. Such flexible 
use of our linguistic resources is an essential part of our pragmatic 
competence. In certain situations accommodation to the recipient’s 
restricted linguistic ability leads to the use a special language; terms such 
as “baby talk” (or “motherese”) and “foreigner talk” refer to this (see 
Freed 1981). Genre design is thus a wider concept referring to a certain 
type of discourse, while RD deals with a concrete communication 
situation.  
Conducting RD is often preferable from the point of view of the 
Speaker’s needs and aims in interaction. When we are trying to gain 
something, it is especially important to be able to express ourselves in an 
effective way, so that the Recipient will be influenced by our words. 
Advertising is a good example of this. Firms aim to increase their sales by 
spending money on advertisements, and this leads them to use the services 
of specialists to maximize the impact of their campaigns. Another genre 
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where people try very carefully to accommodate their speech to the 
audience is political speeches. Readers of this text are very familiar with 
another genre where impressing the reader is extremely important: writing 
applications to research agencies with the aim of ‘selling’ our research 
plans to those who finance research. Thus, the egocentric goals of the 
Speaker are obvious when trying to gain something, but the need of RD is 
also evident in other situations where we have a clear communicative goal: 
teaching something in a classroom, trying to fix a time for a meeting, 
making a shopping list, asking how to find the railway station.  
Coming back to our examples, we can now illustrate the role of RD by 
considering the problem which derives from the discrepancy between the 
communicants’ MWs with regard to the interpretation of phrase (3) above. 
If (and only if) the speaker foresees the possibility of a mistaken 
interpretation of the phrase, he or she may disambiguate it by saying 
“Chinese language and Chinese philosophy” or “Chinese language and 
general (world) philosophy.” If the speaker were always able to make such 
clarifications in producing speech, this kind (and indeed all kinds) of 
miscommunication would be avoided. If we were able to take into account 
all factors deriving from the recipient’s personality, background, 
emotional state, and physiological state, we would be able to choose our 
words in such a way that misunderstanding would be excluded (Günthner 
&  Luckmann  2001,  58).  As  we  can  see,  RD  is  a  kind  of  superfactor  in  
successful communication, and using it skilfully makes it possible to 
neutralize the influence of other risks of miscommunication. 
Thus, the role of monitoring and RD in successful communication is 
evident. However, this does not mean that we take the Gricean view of the 
cooperative principle as a basis for explaining features of human 
interaction. Grice describes idealistic communication in the same way that 
Chomsky refers to an “ideal native speaker” in grammatical matters. These 
concepts are useful as theoretical positions, but as soon as we start dealing 
with real interaction, we face a totally different world. It is therefore no 
surprise that Grice’s cooperative principle has been heavily criticized (see 
Sarangi & Slembrouck 1992). Our everyday experience proves that people 
often fail to perform RD. During the last two decades or so, 
psycholinguistic experiments have established that the impression of 
frequent failures in RD has a solid foundation. Indeed, when taking the 
role  of  a  speaker,  people  are  much  weaker  at  doing  RD  than  was  
previously thought (see Keysar & Henly 2002; Keyzar 2007; Kecskes & 
Zhang 2009). As speakers, we sometimes even act against our own 
communicative goals.  
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The main explanation for people’s inability to conduct proper RD is 
egocentrism (Barr & Keysar 2005, 23). People are inclined to concentrate 
on what they are saying without considering whether it will be understood 
or not—“When people communicate they do not routinely take into 
account the mental states of others, as the standard theory assumes” 
(Keysar 2007, 72). Having said that, it is important to take a closer look at 
the reasons for insufficient RD or total lack of it (for a more detailed 
analyses, see Mustajoki 2012). Factors causing insufficient RD may be 
classified into two major overlapping categories: (1) the speaker does not 
want to conduct RD, or (2) he or she fails to realize that a more 
appropriate RD is needed. 
(1) Let us first examine situations where the communicants do not 
want to be cooperative. Such an attitude may exist even before the 
beginning of a conversation. It means that the communicants avoid 
interaction. People also report that occasionally, for one reason or another, 
they  pretend to  understand or  not  to  understand what  they  hear  during  a  
conversation (Mustajoki 2006b, 61–65). In the case where a failure of 
communication is caused by non-listening by the recipient, it is due to a 
non-cooperative mode of the recipient. These are quite obvious cases. A 
more covert reason for reluctance to conduct RD is avoidance of cognitive 
effort. Psychologists (for example, Shintel & Keysar 2009) argue that a 
fundamental feature of human behaviour is the avoidance of extra 
cognitive and/or physical effort. As a consequence of this desire, people 
try  to  achieve  their  goals  by  using  as  little  energy  as  possible.  When  
monitoring and conducting RD we spend energy. This means that the 
easiest  and  the  least  energy-consuming  way  of  speaking  is  to  pay  no  
attention to the recipient. There may also be some factors that decrease the 
speaker’s ability to concentrate on interaction, such as tiredness, illness, or 
emotional overdrive.  
The egocentric attitude of the speaker is also the ultimate motivation 
behind another, completely different phenomenon that poses risks to 
communication. In this case the speaker does not avoid cognitive efforts; 
in  fact,  he  or  she  spends  more  energy,  but  the  aim  is  not  to  ensure  
understanding. There are two main types of communicative behaviour of 
this  kind.  One type  is  linked to  the  need to  be  polite,  which  may lead  to  
rather complicated speech that is not easily understood. In other words, the 
use of indirect speech and hints endanger the correct interpretation of the 
message by the recipient. Another communicative tactic which poses a 
risk to mutual understanding derives from our aspiration to be regarded as 
smart and intelligent. This leads to the use of expressions and words than 
are not ideal from the point of view of pure communicative goals. In 
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concrete terms, it means more metaphors, figurative expressions, and 
neologisms, which may make our speech less comprehensible (Montminy 
2010, 318–319). 
(2) When discussing those situations where the speaker is willing to 
conduct RD but is not aware of the need for it, we must pay attention to 
people’s ability to take into account differences between individuals, 
especially the crucial difference between our own MW and the MWs of 
other people. Researchers who have studied this question argue that people 
are inclined to look at the world through their own experience and mental 
state. If we have no clear indicators for differences in the knowledge and 
background of the recipient, we use ourselves as the anchor and reference 
point (Schütz 1944; Keysar and Henly 2002; Kruger et al. 2005; Epley 
2008; Todd et al. 2011). If the recipient differs from us clearly enough, we 
notice it, which is the case in many situations of intercultural 
communication. Nevertheless, awareness of the differences does not 
guarantee avoidance of misunderstanding (Banks & al. 1991; Krasnykh 
2002; Leontovich 2007; Privalova 2005; Bührig & Luzio 2006). A kind of 
“intercultural” communication is also seen in interaction between native 
speakers of the same language whose backgrounds are significantly 
different. Examples would include conversations between an IT adviser 
and an IT user, a young heavy-metal enthusiast and his or her 
grandparents, or a fisherman and a person who has never fished. 
In the situations mentioned above, the speaker, as a rule, realizes the 
need for not using his or her normal language, but nevertheless often fails 
conduct sufficient RD. Quite another risk for communication is the 
“common ground fallacy” (or “false consensus effect,” as Clark 1996, 111 
puts it). The general rule is: the smaller the deviations between the MWs 
of the interlocutors are, the more likely they are to fall into the common 
ground fallacy. The mechanism we use in analysing the need for RD fails 
in situations where group boundaries are not so evident (Gallois & Giles 
1988). This gives us an explanation for Ermakova’s & Zemskaja’s (1993) 
paradoxical claim that communication failures are as usual in 
communication between good friends and relatives as in intercultural 
encounters (for details, see Mustajoki 2011a). 
Risks of Miscommunication in Various Speech Genres  
The way we speak in communication situations is determined by two 
major  factors:  (1)  situational,  where,  on  what  topic,  and  with  whom  we  
speak, and what our role is in the speech act, and; (2) personal, what our 
linguistic background is (Mustajoki 2010). The first factor reflects the idea 
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of speech genres launched by Bakhtin (1996, 181); the second factor refers 
to the restrictions and opportunities based on our linguistic capacity. It is 
impossible to produce a complete list of different speech genres, but it is 
easy enough to name some examples of them, e.g. “public speech,” “small 
talk,” “flirting” “business negotiations,” etc. It is clear to everyone that we 
speak in a very different way in each of these speech genres (Dement’ev 
2009). When entering a new communication situation we switch on the 
way of speaking needed. To be more precise, the decisive thing is not the 
situation as such, but our own personal interpretation of it, as emphasized 
by van Dijk (2006). In other words, we use a certain register of speech if 
we think that we are in a situation where this register is needed. In some 
situations, the interlocutors have to begin by choosing the language to be 
used (Alpatov 2000, 15–20; Mustajoki 2010). 
We have to start our discussion on risks of miscommunication in 
various speech genres with a caveat: it is impossible to offer a detailed 
analysis of this issue because we still lack sufficient research on it. What is 
presented here is therefore not a conclusion based on the study of real 
communicative materials, but an attempt to put forward hypotheses that 
are mainly based on non-systematic observations and will need to be 
verified by further research. We first focus on the specific features of each 
speech genre and then present a table where the genres are described in a 
more structured way. To show the great variety of risks in communication, 
we will consider very diverse speech genres, namely: (1) everyday 
conversation at home; (2) shopping; (3) flirting; (4) the shouts of a football 
spectator; (5) regular work meeting; (6) international meeting in a lingua 
franca language; (7) a president’s address to the nation. 
(1) Conversations at home involve a wide variety of topics for 
discussion. Nevertheless, there are some features which are typical of this 
genre as a whole. The communicants meet each other every day for years, 
the situation is part of their leisure, and they usually feel maximally 
relaxed. All these factors diminish the willingness of the communicants to 
make cognitive efforts while speaking. The circumstances are also 
favourable to the kind of communication on which the interlocutors do not 
concentrate: they are often engaged in some other activity at the same 
time. This leads to mishearings and non-listening. In addition, due to the 
very routine-like conditions, people are lazy in articulation, which 
increases the risk of misundestanding. On the other hand, the 
communicants guess, without any hesitation, those parts of another 
speaker’s  phrases  that  they  have  not  heard.  They  do  so  because  they  
“know” the others so well that it  is easy to reckon what they want to say 
(or so they assume). The common ground fallacy is a frequent trap for 
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communicants because they are sure that the people they live with “must” 
think in the same way as they do and even think of the same thing at the 
same time. Generally speaking, while at home, we suppose that no RD is 
required except in those situations where we badly need to obtain a 
particular result. 
(2) In shopping situations, the roles of communicants are very 
different. The salesperson is a professional and takes part in such 
conversations several times a day, while the customer is involved in such 
situations only occasionally. For both parties, successful interaction is in 
itself desirable: the salesperson wants to sell something and the customer 
wants to find a maximally suitable realization for her or his needs. For the 
salesperson, the biggest challenge is to accommodate her or his speech to 
each customer, bearing in mind that different customers may have totally 
different amounts of background knowledge in the relevant field (think for 
example of electronics, wines, clothing). Another difficulty is choosing the 
appropriate register (on the scale colloquial–official) so as to make the 
customer feel comfortable and to avoid irritation. As to the customers, the 
main risk is that they may have problems in formulating their wishes, 
which may be unclear even to themselves. 
(3) From the point of view of monitoring and recipient design, a 
challenging  genre  is  flirtation.  The  person  who  starts  it  has  their  own  
egocentric  goals  in  doing  so.  These  vary  from  pure  fun  to  an  attempted  
conquest. In both cases, the flirter gains satisfaction from being able to 
conduct such a discourse (Henningsen 2004). The object of the flattery 
may feel uncomfortable or may, on the contrary, try by their own 
behaviour to urge the other party to continue flirting. For both 
communicants, the whole situation stands out from the normal routine of 
everyday communication. This may lead them to report such a 
conversation to other people afterwards. 
(4) When a football spectator shouts to the referee, we are dealing with 
a rather frequent speech genre which, however, differs very much from 
normal face-to-face conversations between two persons. The main specific 
feature of spectator behaviour is the distance to the recipient, which in fact 
means that he or she does not hear what is said (shouted). The speaker 
(shouter) is in a very emotional mood, and it therefore makes no difference 
to him or her that the referee does not actually hear the effusion. In this 
respect, the situation somewhat resembles the scene where someone 
unburdens their heart after an unpleasant experience. In such a situation, 
the opportunity to speak is in itself the main reason of communication; 
transmitting pieces of information to the recipient is of secondary 
importance. An extra feature of the case of the shouting spectator is that 
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there are a lot of co-spectators around and they, in fact, become the 
unintended audience of the emotional outburst. 
(5) Participants of a regular work meeting have, in principle, equal 
roles in the communication (apart from the chairperson). Nevertheless, 
they differ from each other as to their background knowledge, ability to 
express themselves, and motivation to influence the course of events. In a 
meeting there are always some rules and regulations which determine how 
it is conducted, so that people are not allowed to speak at the same time. In 
most cases, these rules are broken at least to some extent. In trying to 
reach their goals in the decision-making process, the participants may 
deliberately mishear and misunderstand each other’s words. Eagerness in 
trying to say something may lead to unclear expressions. The common 
ground fallacy is also possible, because people at the same workplace tend 
to assume that everyone knows the same things and thinks along similar 
lines. 
(6) There are, of course, various types of international meetings. To 
consider the specific nature of this genre, let us take the following scene: 
people from different European countries meet in Brussels to discuss an 
issue on which where they are specialists. They are native speakers of 
several languages and speak in lingua franca English. Such a meeting 
differs  from a  regular  work  meeting  in  two relevant  ways.  First,  even in  
our days international encounters are something special. Travelling to a 
foreign country and having a meeting there is a much more remarkable 
event than attending a meeting during the working day with people you 
see every day. This makes the participants concentrate more intently on 
the course of the discussion. The second feature of such a meeting is even 
more significant. The use of a lingua franca language adds a paradoxical 
feature to communication: people understand each other better than in 
normal situations due to simplified language, a hightened motivation to 
understand, and concentration on the topic (Mustajoki 2011a). Studies on 
the use of English as a lingua franca confirm this observation (Mauranen 
2006 and Firth 2009, among others). Of course, differences in 
geographical backgrounds constitute a risk for misunderstandings, but 
expertise on the topic of the meeting diminishes the significance of this 
factor.  
(7) A president’s address to the nation is a very special genre. The 
speech is important for the president, and he or she therefore tries to take 
maximum account of the large audience. This is not easy, because the 
listeners (spectators) are very heterogeneous, from political enemies to 
supporters. The main target is a large number of uninterested and passive 
citizens. The significance of the address leads the president to use a large 
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group of assistants in compiling it. So here we see an extremely careful 
audience design which has a clearly egoistic origin. Despite the major 
efforts, misunderstandings and misinterpretations are usual because of the 
possible unwillingness of the recipients to understand. A serious risk to the 
success of the speech is non-listening (non-watching), resulting from the 
feeling that the speaker is repeating the same thing as earlier. 
 
Table 2.1. Recipient design and risks of communication in different discourse types (Sp = the speaker, Re = 
recipient) 
 
 
 Special features of the genre 
Monitoring and recipient 
design (RD) Main risks for miscommunication 
Everyday 
conversations at 
home 
Communicants know each other 
very well; most relaxed situation; 
wide range of possible topics  
Minimal monitoring and RD 
because there is no need to avoid 
risks in communication  
Non-listening due to poor 
concentration on conversation; non-
hearing and mishearing (e.g. due to 
a vacuum-cleaner or distance 
between the communicants); 
unclear pronunciations (due to fast 
speech); over-guessing of speech 
heard only partially; common 
ground fallacy 
Shopping Totally different roles of 
communicants (professional vs. 
layman), through a common goal: 
a purchase that makes the 
customer happy; for the 
customer, an important but not a 
usual situation 
An experienced salesperson does 
RD all the time; the customer is 
weak at RD  
 
Problems in finding a common 
language due to differences in 
knowledge level (especially as to 
complicated technology); inability 
of the consumer to express 
him/herself; the salesperson may get 
tired of repeating the same phrases 
all the time  
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Flirting A marked game element; 
important for Sp’s self-esteem 
Constant monitoring and RD in 
order to decide whether to 
continue flirting or not;   
Total lack of interest by Re; 
gushiness of Sp 
Football spectator 
shouting 
Addressee (Re) is far away and 
does not hear the speech; real 
Re’s are co-spectators; channel 
for emotional eruption 
Totally egocentric; Sp does not 
think of Re at all 
Understanding or even listening by 
Re (the referee) is not expected; co-
spectators may be irritated  
Work meeting Participants of the meeting know 
each other quite well; the topic of 
discussion is planned beforehand; 
not a free discussion but 
regulated by the chairperson; goal 
orientation; MWs of participants 
have much in common 
For a skilful participant RD is a 
necessary element of speech  
Emotions may hinder RD; 
deliberate misunderstandings; 
frustration of participants if the 
discussion veers off course  
International 
meeting in a 
lingua franca 
language 
All participants speak in a non-
native language; strong 
motivation for understanding; 
otherwise as in work meetings   
Communicants automatically 
conduct RD by using a simplified 
language and by trying to be 
understandable  
Differences in cultural 
(geographical) background; 
deficiency in language skills; 
otherwise as in work meeting 
President’s TV-
address to the 
nation 
Very significant for Sp; reactions 
of the audience (media) have 
influence on the planning of the 
next address 
Professional RD before the 
presentation with the help of 
experts  
Very heterogeneous audience with 
different expectations; most 
spectators listen only superficially; 
prejudices towards Sp  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to demonstrate the differences in the risks 
of communication in various speech genres. In discussing the topic, a 
multidimensional model of communication was used. This helps us to take 
into account divergent factors influencing the course of interaction. It was 
shown that besides purely linguistic factors (such as syntactic ambiguity), 
the mental worlds of interlocutors play an important role in reaching 
mutual understanding. A further factor, the speaker’s ability to conduct 
recipient design, has an even greater significance because it is able to 
neutralize other risks of communication. However, this factor materializes 
only if the speaker is aware of the risks and is able to formulate his or her 
speech in an appropriate manner. Both observations of real communication 
and psychological experiments show that recipient design often fails. 
The theoretical framework was applied to some speech genres in order 
to  discuss  the  risks  of  communication  that  occur  in  them.  It  was  shown  
that speech genres differ very much from each other in this respect. The 
results are still partly hypothetical and need to be verified by further 
research,  but  even on the  basis  of  this  analysis  it  is  possible  to  conclude  
that risks of miscommunication are very speech-genre specific, so this 
factor cannot be dismissed in research on them. 
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